is any non-human sin (in the fallen angels, for example) the product of antecedent sufficient causes either. According to Augustine, therefore, God is not the ultimate cause of any sin.
Beyond that, Augustine's whole defense of his doctrine of limited election rested on an idea that virtually all compatibilists in the philosophical world reject: the idea of intrinsic desert, 16 which entails that certain punishments (or certain rewards, as the case may be) are intrinsically fitting responses to certain actions. As a result of original sin, he argued, we are all part of a corrupt mass, are all guilty of a heinous sin against God, and are all such that we deserve to suffer everlastingly for our sin. Everlasting punishment, in other words, is the intrinsically fitting response to our sinful condition, which is somehow "our" doing, not God's. The non-elect cannot justifiably complain, therefore, when God merely gives them the punishment they deserve. For "who but a fool," Augustine declared, "would think God unfair either when he imposes penal judgment on the deserving or when he shows mercy to the undeserving?" 17 Applying this to the story of Jacob and Esau, Augustine went on to suggest that God "loved Jacob in unmerited mercy, yet hated Esau with merited justice." 18 His entire defense of limited election, then, rested upon the assumption that we are all morally responsible for a libertarian free choice (albeit Adam's original sin) that God himself did not causally determine. In Augustine's own words, "the whole human race was condemned in its apostate head by a divine judgment so just that even if not a single member of the race were ever saved from it, no one could rail against God's justice."
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Grace and Incompatibilism
The Augustinian understanding of limited election, which implies that even those who die as unbaptized infants will be eternally separated from God, is one that most Christian philosophers today would reject as both morally repugnant and inconsistent with the loving nature of God. And as I have already indicated, Baker suggests, correctly in my opinion, that we should divorce the doctrine of predestination and salvation by grace from this morally repugnant doctrine of limited election.
What some appear not to have appreciated, however, is that the Augustinian understanding of salvation by grace also rests upon an explicitly incompatibilist conception of moral responsi- cording to Ware, all credit for salvation goes to God because he graciously regenerates the hearts of the elect, causing them to repent, it is surely fair to ask: Why should not all the blame for damnation likewise go to God, if he brings those who are eventually damned into an earthly existence, allows them to inherit a sinful nature not of their own generating and over which they have no control, blinds them to the truth, and causes them to he hard of heart? The question is especially acute for any Christian who, like Baker, appears to accept a fully deterministic scheme, but who also, unlike Baker, insists that God restricts his grace to a limited elect.
Still, given her apparent acceptance of determinism, even Baker must confront such questions as these: If God is the ultimate cause of both a good and an evil will, 25 then how are we to maintain, if at all, the traditional Christian asymmetry between merited blame (in the case of sin)
and unmerited favor (in the case of salvation from sin)? If God's being the ultimate cause of a person's bad will, as Baker seems to believe, does not transfer the blame for the bad will from the person to God, why should God's being the ultimate cause of a person's good will transfer credit for the good will from the person to God? And if Christians deserve moral credit for the transformed will that God brings about in them, why should they not take full credit for it?
Arminians and other freewill theists typically try to account for the relevant asymmetry in the following way: Salvation, faith, and a transformed heart, they insist, are themselves a gift that we have the power to refuse. So if we freely exercise our power to refuse the gift, then we have no one but ourselves to blame; but if we do not freely refuse the gift, we still are in no position to take moral credit for that which is essentially a freely offered gift. A strength of this Arminian view is that, unlike Baker's view, it does not make God the ultimate cause of sin. But a weakness, in my opinion, is that it takes no account of the New Testament idea that our natural unwillingness to be rescued is part of the very condition from which we need to be rescued. Nor should we liken Jesus Christ, I contend, to a lifeguard who throws a lifeline to a drowning swimmer, leaving it up to the swimmer whether or not to grasp the line; we should instead liken him to a lifeguard who drags an unconscious swimmer, incapable of even grasping a lifeline, out of the water to safety. As Jesus himself put it, "And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw [or drag in much the way that a fisherman uses a net to drag fish to shore] all people to my- those who commit certain sins are "worthy of death," and this may initially appear to imply that death is the intrinsically fitting punishment for sin. But the appearance is in fact misleading. For within the context of Pauline theology as a whole, the relationship between sin and death is clearly non-contingent. First, the relevant death, which Paul elsewhere described as "the wages"
(or the price) of sin 30 and also as "the end" of sin, 31 is spiritual death; it is separation from God and from the ultimate source of human happiness. Nor could it have been otherwise, because in sinning one precisely chooses death over life, separation over reconciliation. In Paul's own words, "To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace." 32 So death, which is the unavoidable consequence of sin, is its intrinsically fitting punishment only in the sense that a painful burn is the intrinsically fitting punishment for intentionally thrusting one's hand into a fire.
Whatever position one might take on the issue of intrinsic desert and "metaphysical guilt,"
however, orthodox Christianity has always denied that God is the sufficient cause of either sin or its unavoidable consequence, namely spiritual death. God is instead the "Great Destroyer" who destroys sin and death in the end and thereby rescues his loved ones from these two great enemies. But if that is true, how might we plausibly understand this matter?
Indeterminism, Separation, and the Mystery of Created Personhood
Reflect for a moment on the context in which our earliest choices in fact arise. We all emerge as self aware beings and begin making choices in a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception, and behind our earliest choices lie a host of genetically determined inclinations and environmental (including social and cultural) influences. Beyond that, our inborn instincts initially compel us as children to pursue, even as the higher animals do, our own needs and interests, as we perceive (or misperceive) them. Such a context comes close to guaranteeing, I should think, that we would all start out in life repeatedly misconstruing our own interests, given the Christian understanding of them, and repeatedly pursuing them in misguided ways; it comes close to guaranteeing, in other words, that we would repeatedly "miss the mark," which is the literal meaning of at least one Hebrew word for sin. For even if a small child's behavior manifests a good deal of causal contingency, as I believe it does, the absence of clarity together with the child's other natural impulses virtually guarantees that it will at times act disobediently and in egocentric ways. 33 That is the enduring element of truth, as I see it, in the traditional understanding of original sin-which, in my opinion, has nothing to do with inherited guilt. Because we are born into a context that virtually guarantees misguided choices almost from the beginning of our lives, particularly in the absence of firm and loving parental guidance, and because our choices (or quasi-choices) made in ignorance 34 begin shaping our character even before we are
fully aware of what is happening to us, it is almost as if we were born with a bad moral character-or an "inherited" sinful nature, 35 to use the theological term-not of our own choosing.
So how should a Christian who rejects both the idea of inherited guilt and the idea that our current condition is a punishment for Adam's original sin understand these matters? The answer lies, I believe, in the mystery of created personhood. Although creatures such as ourselves are clearly possible-we do, after all, exist-we know almost nothing about what is, and is not, metaphysically possible in the matter of creating independently rational creatures who are (a) aware of themselves as distinct from their environment and from other people, (b) capable of acting on their own and of making rational judgments concerning the best course of action, and (c) capable of learning from experience and from the consequences of their actions. It is easy enough to imagine an omnipotent being instantaneously creating a self-aware, language using, fully rational, and morally mature person who is capable of acting on his or her own, but I, for one, see no reason to think this metaphysically possible at all. 36 My aim here, however, is not to defend my own convictions in this matter; it is instead to contrast two very different metaphysical pictures and two very different ways of explaining the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin.
Accordingly, as a contrast to the Augustinian explanation already discussed, let us now consider the radically different hypothesis that God had no choice, provided he wanted to create any persons at all, but to create them in much the way he in fact created us-that is, he had no choice but to permit their embryonic minds to emerge and to begin functioning on their own in a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and indeterminism. 37 The supposition here is that in creating independent rational agents, or in bringing them into being from the abyss, so to speak, God had to satisfy certain metaphysically necessary conditions of their coming into being, and these include what I shall call, for want of a better expression, an initial separation from God. By this admittedly vague expression, I mean to imply, among other things, a severance from God's direct causal control on the metaphysical level and an experience of frustrated desire and frustrated will-the sort of thing that naturally leads to a sense of estrangement and alienation-on the psychological level. 38 If these should be metaphysically necessary conditions of our creation, then our very creation would virtually guarantee 39 the occurrence of error and misguided choices. So whereas the Augustinians hold that we would never have inherited our sinful dispositions and moral weaknesses, had Adam not failed his test in the Garden of Eden, our alternative hypothesis implies that these are, from a practical perspective, unavoidable consequence of conditions essential to our creation-that is, conditions essential to our emergence as individual centers of consciousness with an ability to make rational judgments and to learn for ourselves important lessons from experience and from the consequences of our own actions. What some
Christians will no doubt find controversial here, perhaps even heretical, is the further implication that our first parents came into being with the same sinful dispositions and moral weaknesses common to the rest of us.
Before addressing that issue, however, I want first to clarify a point and then to suggest some definite theological advantages, as I view them, in our alternative hypothesis. The point to be clarified is this: If creatures such as ourselves could never have emerged in a fully deterministic context, then neither could human consciousness, human rationality, or human freedom have so emerged. But even if one were to grant all of this, a possible position would nonetheless be that our genuinely free actions, or perhaps the freest of all our actions, are fully determined by our immediate desires, beliefs, and reasonable judgments concerning the best course of action.
So in no way does our alternative non-Augustinian hypothesis entail the standard libertarian conception of freewill. We are considering, after all, two different ways of explaining the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin, both of which reject the idea that we start out as free moral agents. Whereas the Augustinians try to explain this by appealing to the unavoidable effects of original sin in our lives, our alternative explanation appeals to the unavoidable consequences of conditions essential to our creation. It seems utterly non-controversial, moreover, that young children are not yet moral agents and therefore not yet free moral agents, however causally undetermined much of their behavior might be. 40 But in addition to that, many traditional Christians, both inside and outside the Augustinian tradition, have believed that, with the one exception of Jesus Christ, all the descendents of Adam are already sinners, already "dead"
in their "trespasses and sins," 41 from the very beginning of their moral consciousness. Such
Christians typically take their cue from St. Paul, who described the context in which our moral consciousness first emerges as a kind of bondage or enslavement to the personified powers of sin and death. Some of Paul's words-as when, for instance, he wrote: "For sin, seizing an oppor-tunity in the commandment, deceived me and through it killed me" 42 -might even be taken to imply that sin is something that happens to us rather than something we do freely from the beginning of our lives. Now as I see it, our alternative non-Augustinian hypothesis has several advantages for Christians, and I shall here mention three-recognizing, of course, that others may not regard them as advantages at all. First, and perhaps most important of all, our alternative hypothesis enables us to abandon two unfortunate Augustinian ideas: that of inherited guilt and that of God's having punished the entire human race for the sin of Adam. It enables us to abandon these ideas, moreover, without compromising the idea that, because sin and spiritual death threaten the very possibility of a life worth living, they are genuine enemies that God is bound by his own nature eventually to destroy. They are enemies in the sense that they stand in direct opposition to
God's will for our lives.
Second, our alternative hypothesis also enables us to deny that God is the cause of sin even as we let the chips fall where they may with respect to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Just where the proverbial chips might fall will no doubt depend on a host of issues, such as the nature of moral guilt, the point of holding people morally responsible, and the question of alternative possibilities-issues that lie far beyond the scope of this paper. But wherever the chips might fall in this matter, it is perhaps worth pointing out that even a compatibilist such as Daniel Dennett appears to concede that a purposive agent's non-coercive control (or manipulation) of our desires, beliefs, and will is incompatible with genuine autonomy. Dennett thus distinguishes mere determinism from various non-coercive forms of control, arguing that, however exhaustively it may determine our future, "the past does not control us," at least not in the way a purposive agent might. It does not control us in the latter sense because "there is nothing in the past to foresee and plan for our particular acts"; neither are there "feedback signals from the present to the past for the past to exploit." 43 Remarkably, Dennett even concedes that a Laplacean "superhuman intelligence" that also determines the future could easily control us and would indeed undermine our compatibilist autonomy. 44 As even Dennett appears to concede, therefore, not even compatibilist autonomy could exist in a theistic universe in which God causally determines every event.
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Finally, if our very creation requires an indeterministic process and therefore a causal break from the past, then we can accept both an important claim that libertarians have made and an important objection to the standard libertarian analysis. We can accept, on the one hand, the libertarian claim that none of our free actions are the product of sufficient causes that lie in the distant past. For if, thanks to the causal break at the beginning of our own lives and the lives of our ancestors as well, none of our actions, not even the determined ones, are the product of sufficient causes that lie in the distant past, then neither are our free actions the product of such causes.
We can also accept, on the other hand, the frequently expressed objection that indeterminism of any kind in the process of deliberating and choosing introduces a degree of randomness, even irrationality, into it. The latter claim-which, so far as I can tell, no one has successfully refuted 46 -accords nicely with the idea that, although God is not its cause, sin is nonetheless something that happens to us early in life rather than something we do freely from the beginning of our lives.
Is my point, then, that the concept of freedom is simply incoherent? Not quite. Elsewhere I have suggested that a coherent account of freedom will involve two crucial ideas: first, that freedom, like moral responsibility and rationality, is a matter of degree, and second, that some of the very conditions essential to our emergence as free moral agents are themselves obstacles to a fully realized freedom-obstacles that can be overcome only after our incipient rationality has begun to function on its own and we are therefore capable of learning lessons for ourselves.
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Consider ignorance, for example. Many have suggested that our freedom in relation to God requires that we start out in a context where God remains hidden from us, and I agree. But for as long as God's true nature and very existence remain hidden from us, neither are we free to reject anything but a caricature of God; hence, we are not truly free in relation to God. And similarly for indeterminism: Even if our moral freedom requires that we start out in a context of indeterminism, as I believe it does, the randomness and irrationality that indeterminism implies is nonetheless an obstacle to a fully realized freedom. 48 So perhaps Paul, who regarded freedom as a consequence of our salvation rather than as a precondition of it, had something to teach us about freedom after all. For according to Paul, our earliest moral experience arises from an emerging ability to understand moral rules (or the moral law), and it is inevitably an experience of the will in bondage to sin. Our salvation, therefore, consists in our being released from this bondage, so that our wills can be set "free from the law of sin and death." 49 Put it this way: God can correct us and eventually transform us only after we have emerged as rational agents who can either cooperate in the process or learn important lessons from our refusal to cooperate.
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Still, whatever the perceived advantages of our non-Augustinian hypothesis might be, some will no doubt object to its implication that our first parents came into being with the same sinful dispositions and moral weaknesses common to the human race as a whole. But as is now well known (thanks to John Hick in particular), St Irenaeus, the Bishop of Lyons between roughly 177 and 202 A.D., did not view the first human sin as a fall from a higher state to a lower one. In that respect, his view was quite different from Augustine's, and I think it important to appreciate, first, how well the above non-Augustinian hypothesis comports with the Irenaean understanding of original sin, and second, how well the Irenaean understanding comports with the primary rect causal control and our incipient rationality begins functioning on its own, God can relate to us not merely as the Creator who designed us and certainly not as a manipulative agent who controls all of our desires, beliefs, and judgments, but as a loving parent who works with us, guides us, and corrects us even as he permits us to learn valuable lessons from experience and from the consequences of our actions. According to the Christian religion, moreover, love is the one power in the universe that transforms without manipulating; hence, it is through sacrifice and acts of self-giving love that God will eventually transform us without manipulating us. And, of course, the supreme sacrifice, as Christians understand it, was God's Son having "emptied himself," having taken "the form of a slave," and having suffered a humiliating death on a Cross 59 -though it was also, according to the author of Hebrews, the Son's triumph over death and the fear of it that enabled him to "free those who all their lives were held in slavery by the fear of death."
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Conclusion
If God is not the cause of sin and did not in effect program us to be sinners, and if, according to Christian theology, we are all "by nature" sinners nonetheless, the question naturally arises concerning the best explanation for the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin.
In opposition to the standard Augustinian explanation, which appeals to the corrupting effects of original sin on the human race as a whole, I have recommended that Christians consider, if only for the purpose of formulating objections to it, the very different hypothesis that God had no choice, provided he wanted to create any persons at all, but to permit their embryonic minds to emerge in a context that virtually guarantees erroneous judgments and misguided choices of a kind that Christians typically associate with sin. I have no doubt that such a hypothesis will raise, as it should, many questions in the minds of thoughtful Christians-most notably questions about the nature of sin and one's responsibility for it. Once the questions are raised, the objections are formulated, and various replies are examined, perhaps then we will be in a better position to assess this alternative hypothesis in a reasonable way. 24 Ibid, p. 39. The form of the sentence quoted here may seem to entail only that God's causal activity is a necessary condition of salvation and not a sufficient condition. But although Ware nowhere employs the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, his expression "effectual and gracious work in their lives" is intended, I think, to convey the idea of a sufficient condition as well. Apart from God's gracious work, no one will be saved; hence, his gracious work is a necessary condition of salvation. And because his gracious work is always effectual, it is also a sufficient condition of salvation. According to Ware, therefore, God's work of grace in a person's heart is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of salvation. Ware thus writes: "At its heart, the doctrine of unconditional election assures the believer that salvation, from beginning to end, is all of God (Ibid, p. 59-his italics). 33 I do not mean to imply that the above-mentioned "genetically determined inclinations" and "inborn instincts" are bad in and of themselves-as if a newborn baby could flourish without them. Neither do I mean to imply that we have here a sufficient cause of specific bad judgments and misguided choices. It is instead the combination of our genetically determined inclinations and a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and indeterminism that virtually guarantees, given a long enough stretch of time, bad judgments and misguided choices. 34 Contrary to a widespread belief I have encountered, the New Testament clearly endorses the idea that even our worst sins are grounded in ignorance. Whether or not Paul actually wrote (in his own hand) the letter known as I Timothy, for example, the self-description attributed to him there surely did reflect accurately the converted Paul's understanding of his former life. Having been the most prominent religious terrorist of his day, he regarded himself as "the foremost" or "the worst" of sinners (1:16 & 17) , and he sincerely believed, no doubt, that he had nonetheless "received mercy because" he "had acted ignorantly in unbelief" (1:13). Even Paul, therefore, seems to have acknowledged the essential role that ignorance plays in sin. So did Jesus. For even though his well-known prayer from the Cross: "Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing" (Lk. 13:34), does not appear in some of the best manuscripts, it surely does represent a reliable tradition. And besides, Peter made virtually the same point to a group whom he charged with killing "the Author of life": "I know that you acted in ignorance, as did also your rulers" (Acts: 3:17): So the Christian Scriptures clearly testify to the essential role that ignorance plays in even the worst of sins 36 A question that might naturally arise for a Christian at this point concerns the creation of angels. Are they not "self-aware, language using, fully rational, and morally mature"?-and are they not capable of acting on their own?
Perhaps. But we have almost no biblical information on how they came into being. So my hypothesis in its most radical form is that not even the angels could have been created instantaneously as fully rational and morally mature agents, or even as sinless beings. For all we are told, they may have experienced eons of evolution and moral development before they appear on the human scene.
37 I shall make no attempt, for obvious reasons, to prove this hypothesis; nor shall I argue for it, except insofar as I discuss some of its advantages for Christians. The fact is that interesting proofs are hard to come by in philosophy, particularly with respect to matters that deeply divide us, and, for that very reason, are probably overrated. But in any event, important discussions relevant to a partial defense of the hypothesis now under consideration would in- 38 A newborn baby comes screaming into this earthly life with what, from its own point of view, must be incredible frustration; and even in the most loving families, the baby will continue to experience many periods of frustration as its developing will comes into conflict with its surroundings. For all we know, moreover, it could not have been otherwise; that is, for all we know, it is metaphysically impossible for an individual center of consciousness with a will of its own to emerge in the absence of all frustration of this kind.
39 I am not claiming that a sinless life in created persons is logically impossible. But even if, with respect to each of our early choices, the odds of making a wrong choice were an even 50/50, it would still be virtually inevitable that we would make a misstep sooner or later. If you add in a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception, then the odds of such a misstep occurring sooner or later become astronomical.
their actions. Whether a dog leaps this way or that while playfully romping in the yard may simply be a matter of random chance.
